A cause of confusion has perhaps been the mistaken application to the metaphor of Aristotle's criticism of the Phaedo at De gen. et corr., 335b 14–15.Google Scholar, page 204 note 2 The result is particularly clear in two remarks by Taylor and by Bluck. It is curious that in his commentary, p. 161, Hackforth should go out of his way to criticize Plato precisely for making fire the only cause of heat. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, pp. For snow is never hot. An Analytic Outline of Plato's Phaedo Brian B. Clayton THE FIRST THREE IMMORTALITY ARGUMENTS IN THE "PHAEDO" 1. "clr": false, Only some opposite forms have things essentially characterized by them: for there is nothing that in Plato's sense is only large and not small. cit., p. 143Google Scholar, seeks to contrast with the present passage of the Phaedo two passages in the Parmenides, 128e6–129a6 and 130 b, where he finds only forms and ‘sensible participants’. We shall see in a moment that Hackforth also equates and in this passage as ‘immanent form’. page 211 note 1 103 d6. 2 The argument from recollection. I 199 from the course of the argument,' that the opposite character in each example is the particularization of an opposite form.z Socrates begins the argument by distinguishing the particular character of largeness from the subject in which the character inheres, 102 a Io-d 4:3 This was agreed. Phaedo, is the longest of the tetralogy and also deliberated to have the most in depth dialogue and has become quite significant to most philosophers. In this way the opposite form of life exhibits a new degree of exclusiveness. But how could snow ‘possess’ some thing and impress its ‘character’ upon it? page 206 note 3 Whether at this moment, 104c8–9, we supply and so think of the form of three, or whether we think of particular three, does not affect the interpretation of the metaphor. page 202 note 1 We observe below, p. 213, that Plato probably thinks of simply as number. pp. "metricsAbstractViews": false, Now Plato introduces a new feature: things like fire and snow that can be only hot or only cold. writes, Bluck, p. 118: ‘If a man who is bad in a certain respect is to become good in the same respect, the “bad in him” must first depart—it must either “flee and give way” or “perish’. The form of three could properly be said not to ‘stay behind’ at the approach of an opposite form. "metrics": true, for this article. But this is too strict an interpretation of Plato has immediately before this deliberately introduced a new element into the argument ( 102e 10): namely, substances such as fire and snow in addition to the particularizations of opposite forms. Keyt, , p. 169 n. I.Google Scholar, page 210 note 1 The scope of the law of opposites was defined at 70d7–e6 to include all opposites and Strictly perhaps soul does not offend this law. The Phaedo's final argument ends at 106e-107a with the conclusion ‘a soul is something immortal and indestructible, and our souls really will exist in Hades’. All Rights Reserved. Ls: Socrates is alive “___(…” is the conditional sign; it’s read as “If ___, then …”, or “If p, then q”. But in this argument cannot as yet properly be intermediate three, for at 104c 1–3 and by implication at 106 a 1 (cf. In the Phaedo, Plato provides several arguments in an attempt to prove the immorality of the soul. page 222 note 1 There would in fact be this difference between the two examples. Socrates’ second argument (pp. 17–18Google Scholar, and less confidently Phronesis ii (1957). This study offers a new analysis of the last argument of Plato's Phaedo for the immortality of the soul. This at least is the notion presented in Phaedrus 245 c–e. See the passages quoted by Verdenius, , p. 235. 212 n. 2 and 217 n. 2. Judgements on its value have usually been adverse. page 217 note 2 Hackforth's interpretations of this passage, if carried to their conclusion, lead to hopeless confusion. The Phaedo is Plato’s attempt to convince us of the immortality of the soul by using several main arguments. Wagner, W., Plato's Phaedo, etc., Cambridge, 1870Google Scholar. vi (1956), 33–34Google Scholar; Verdenius, , pp. A summary of Part X (Section11) in Plato's Phaedo. * Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 5th December 2020. page 201 note 1 This way of thinking is clearly represented in Shorey, , see p. 209Google Scholar n. I below. page 226 note 1 Opinions on the possibility of soul as form have been given above, p. 219. page 218 note 1 It follows that in the preliminary statement of the numerical example, 104b 2–3, is later expressed as in line with 104e8–10. The final argument based on Forms is the only one Plato deems truly definitive, refuting the doubts of Simmias and Cebes (See The Objections by Simmias and Cebes & Replies to Simmias and Cebes). To this extent alive and dead are as exclusive as odd and even. page 200 note 1 Hackforth, remarks, p. 155, as others have done, that large and small are not qualities but relations. 19 Wachsmuth, ; and p. 161.Google Scholar. Others who have tried to deal with immanent form in the Phaedo are: Tarrant, D., The Hippias Major (Cambridge, 1928), pp. cit., p. 117: the addition of ‘can hardly be because Plato wanted to make it plain that he had referred to the Form’.Google Scholar. Socrates gives us four reasons to think that the soul is different from the attunement of an instrument: (1) the soul can exist before the body is made, (2) there are no degrees of soul like there are degrees of attunement, (3) if the attunement argument were correct, it would imply that no souls were better or worse than any other souls, and (4) the soul is master of the body. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. 216–17 above. Phaedo relates the dialogue from that day to Echecrates, a Pythagorean philosopher. Plato's Cosmology, p. 184)Google Scholar; and Bluck, , pp. Please, subscribe or login to access full text content. 162, 163, and 165. page 205 note 3 This is the interpretation of Stallbaum, followed by Schmidt, , ii, pp. 135b17–26, 147a20–31, De soph. Hot and cold therefore can be manifested as more exclusive opposites than large and small. In fact Plato's distinction in the Parmenides between the form of likeness and ‘the likeness which we have’ is precisely the same as the distinction in the Phaedo between the form of large and ‘the large in us’. N.s. A problem with the argument as outlined in your handout is that C1 (souls must be alive and cannot be dead) in fact does not follow logically from P1 (An organism has a soul if and only if it is alive). On the question of intermediates in the Phaedo see Ross, , P. Ivi–lviiGoogle Scholar; Demos, R., ‘Note on Plato's Theory of Ideas’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research viii (1947–1948), 456–60Google Scholar; Bluck, , pp. Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. page 221 note 5 This interpretation seems to be suggested by Cornford's article on the passage. (Similarly, fire itself is not an opposite; but in so far as it is characterized by hot it is, we may suppose, an ). But the fact that Socrates’ example of accidental attribution has to be expressed in terms of one thing's relation to another is incidental to the main purpose of the argument. "lang": "en" That no doubt is one reason why Plato chooses the example which he does. page 199 note 2 I use the term ‘particularization’ to express the sensible manifestation of the form of an attribute as well as of the form of a substance. It goes hand to hand with the application of the theory of forms to the question of the soul's immortality, as Plato constantly reminds us, the theory of forms is the most certain of all his theories. Bluck, R. S., A Translation of Plato's Phaedo, etc., London 1955Google Scholar. It was the last dialogue of the seven that he wrote in the middle period of Socrates final days the others included Theaetetus, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Statesman and … On the other hand the form of three could not have applied to it the rest of the metaphor. For fire can turn something into fire: but it is not obvious that snow can turn something into snow. page 211 note 2 103e 2. Equally, in the previous image the point may be not so much that Simmias and Socrates stay the same size, though that will in fact have to be so, but that despite the approach in some way of smallness Simmias continues to be compared to Socrates. For there are in effect two possible particularizations: the particular attribute, relative largeness or smallness, and the Simmias or Socrates.